‘Contemporary Syria-liberalization between cold war and cold peace’ is a collection of essays from a conference on Economic and Political Change in Syria held in May 1993 at School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS) in London. Eberhard Kienle, a lecturer in Middle Eastern Politics at SOAS had compiled this book. He has also included a brief preface by Patrick Seale which questions the relationship between economic and political liberalisation in Syria during the regime of Hafez al- Assad.
With nine scholarly papers from the speakers at the conference, ‘Contemporary Syria‘ sometimes turns repetitive as every scholar starts with the same fundamental facts. Slowly, the pace is picked, other countries like US,Israel, Russia and Lebanon are bought into debate, economic analysis is done and finally, the paper tends to be different. Over and over again, it is declared that Hafez saw no connection between economic and popular freedoms, encouragement for private sector and progress towards democracy and between increasing cordial relations with US and power sharing along with respect for human rights.
The author could have used a better title for the book because the term ‘Liberalization between cold war and cold peace’ does not make immediate sense. Also, there is very limited, if any, mention of cold war and its effect on Syria in any of the included papers. Syria is exposed as a state where ‘liberalisation‘ is eclipsed by ‘liberation’ from adverse effects of forces of imperialism and Zionism.
Economic liberalization in Syria took place in two distinct parts. Intifah is used as an Arab currency term for defining this process but it was later abandoned after it matched with Sadat’s strategies.
The first process started soon after Hafez took power from 16th November 1970. The private sector started entering into manufacturing and tourism. It also gained importance especially after October War of 1973 as the scope of intifah towards private sector and Western companied opened. This phase involved political restructuring such as establishment of parliament in 1971 and adoption of a new constitution in 1973. National Progressive Front involving Ba’ath parties, Arab Socialist Union, Syrian Communist Parties, Organisation of Socialist Unionists, was established in 1972.
Sarcastically, ‘popular democracy’ was the code word where Syrian people had to consent to authoritarian rule which served their interests.
The need for second intifah began after 1978 when wages and agricultural procurement prices were affected by inflation, corruption and nepotism. Intervention in Lebanon was unpopular, several Alawis were assassinated between 1979-1982 and finally, the Hama Massacre of 1982. Even the Commercial bank of Syria had declined to provide private sector with foreign exchange needed for imports. In return, black markets and currency smuggling grew. The government imposed the Law no. 24 of 1986 against smuggling of currency. It was only later in 1991, the Law Number 10. was implemented that really opened spaces for private sector investments.
The business class in Syria is politically powerless and fragmented into ‘entrepreneurial class’, ‘business community’, ‘new class’ and ‘bureaucratic bourgeoisie’. The book explains how Syria has turned into a ‘Military and Merchant Dictatorship.‘ The manner in which power drifted into the hands of military after 1970s revamped the life of these geographically peripheral, socially ascending and ethnically minority sectors of the society.
Syria’s Hafez Assad has also called himself the ‘Gorbachev‘ of Middle East or perhaps better than him. He states that ‘perestroika’ started in the world not in late 1990s but right when Assad started his ‘Corrective Movement’ in 1970s.
One can also learn the the symptom of ‘disunity‘ ,’ lack of leadership’ and ‘scattered organisational tendencies‘ in the Syrian opposition right now is a definite trait of their past. The National Alliance for the liberation of Syria, established after the Hama event, consisted of Muslim Brotherhood and secular parties. Most of the opposition parties turned into rivals after dealing with issues like ‘how the opposition should be led’ and ‘concrete attack actions’ that should be adopted.
Taking advantage of ‘Divide and Rule Policy,‘ Hafez implemented an intelligent strategy in Lebanon leading to the signing of ‘Mutual Defence Pact’ in September 1991. This pact gave permission to Syrian military presence in Lebanon. In return, the Law No. 10 of 1991 gave Lebanese entrepreneurs economic assets and significant leverage in Syria.
The hardline on Israel was dependent on Eastern Europe and Republic of Commonwealth of Independent States for economic assistance and advice. The combination of intransigence towards Israel, internal economic recovery and continued ties to former Eastern bloc enabled the coalition for senior military and security officials, Ba’ath Party and central administrative officials and managers of public sector enterprises to retain a predominant position within Syria’s politics. Therefore, no matter how much the private sector develops, it would never be able to cause a political liberalisation in Syria.
In a nutshell, the book gives a descriptive and in-depth insight into Syria’s political and economical scenario. It carries a detailed history of Assad regime which makes it comparatively easier to understand even Bashar al- Assad and his country’s political/economic reality.
shubhdachaudhary 